- Requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 of PCI DSS v4.0.1 have applied to payment pages since 31 March 2025.
- They matter most if your checkout embeds a provider’s payment form in an inline frame. A full redirect to the provider takes you out of the related SAQ A criterion, per PCI SSC FAQ 1588.
- 6.4.3 is about control: an authorized, integrity-checked, justified list of every script the payment page loads.
- 11.6.1 is about detection: alerting on unauthorized changes to the page and its security-relevant HTTP headers, at least weekly or at a frequency set by a targeted risk analysis.
- Tools fall into four types. Most merchants combine browser controls with one detection method.
- Vendors describe what their product supports; only your acquirer or QSA decides whether your setup meets the standard.
This guide is the practical companion to Sigi’s PCI-compliant checkout guide, which explains SAQ A versus SAQ A-EP and why a hosted or redirected checkout shrinks your scope. Here the question is narrower: once script rules apply to your payment page, what actually satisfies them?
Do requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 apply to your checkout?
They apply to your payment page and to any page that can affect the security of an embedded payment form. If you redirect customers to your provider’s own payment page instead, the script-attack criterion does not apply.
They apply to the payment page, and to any web page that can affect the security of an embedded payment form. The PCI Security Standards Council’s FAQ 1588 explains how this works for merchants on the shortest questionnaire. If your page includes a provider’s embedded payment form, such as an inline frame, you must confirm your site is not susceptible to script attacks. You do that either by deploying protections like those in 6.4.3 and 11.6.1, yourself or through a third party, or by getting confirmation from your PCI DSS-compliant provider that its embedded solution, implemented as instructed, protects against those attacks. The criterion does not apply if you redirect the customer to the provider’s own page.
Risky
Embedded payment form on your page
Your page, its tags and its headers surround the provider’s frame. A malicious script on your page can overlay or alter the checkout, so script control and tamper detection are on you, unless your provider confirms in writing that its solution covers it.
Safer
Redirect to the provider’s page
The customer leaves your site to pay. FAQ 1588 says the script criterion does not apply to merchants that redirect. You trade some control over the checkout look for fewer obligations.
Ask the party your questionnaire goes to, usually your acquirer, which questionnaire and which controls it expects before you buy anything. That answer decides how much of this guide you need.
What do 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 ask for, in engineering terms?
Requirement 6.4.3: control every script on the payment page
Requirement 6.4.3 in PCI DSS v4.0.1, available from the PCI SSC document library, covers every payment page script loaded and executed in the consumer’s browser. It has three parts, and each needs evidence an assessor can inspect:
- Authorization. A method to confirm each script is authorized: someone approved it, and the page refuses scripts nobody approved.
- Integrity. A method to assure each script is the version you approved, not a modified copy served from a compromised third party.
- Inventory with justification. A maintained list of every script, with a written business or technical reason for why each is needed.
Requirement 11.6.1: detect unauthorized changes and alert someone
Requirement 11.6.1 asks for a change- and tamper-detection mechanism. It alerts personnel to unauthorized modification of the security-impacting HTTP headers and the contents of payment pages, as received by the consumer’s browser. The check runs at least weekly, or at a frequency your own targeted risk analysis justifies under requirement 12.3.1. SecurityMetrics’ PCI DSS v4.0.1 e-commerce FAQ summarizes the cadence the same way. The phrase “as received by the consumer browser” matters. A check on your server or in your repository does not show what an injected script changed on the way to the customer.
The Council’s March 2025 information supplement, Payment Page Security and Preventing E-Skimming, describes the aim as payment page scripts that are authorized, checked for integrity and monitored for tampering, together with security-impacting HTTP headers. The Council also says the supplement does not add to or replace any requirement, and that it does not judge whether a specific implementation is compliant.
What kinds of tools help with 6.4.3 and 11.6.1?
Search results for this question mix very different products. They fall into four groups, and each one reaches a different part of the two requirements.
1. Browser controls: Content Security Policy and Subresource Integrity
A Content Security Policy (CSP) is an HTTP header that tells the browser which script sources it may run. Anything else is blocked. Its report-to directive sends a violation report when the browser blocks something, so you see attempted changes from real customer sessions. Subresource Integrity (SRI) pins a script tag to a cryptographic hash, and the browser refuses the file if its contents change. Both are web standards from the W3C (CSP Level 3, SRI). Payment providers publish the CSP directives their scripts need; Stripe lists them in its integration security guide.
- Covers well: authorization (the allowlist) and integrity (SRI hashes) under 6.4.3. CSP reports also give real-browser signals that help with 11.6.1.
- Falls short: no inventory with written justifications on its own. SRI cannot pin scripts that a provider changes without notice. Reports need a collector and someone reading them. CSP does not by itself alert you to changed HTTP headers.
- Adds to the page: nothing. These are headers and attributes, not another script.
2. Monitoring at the CDN or edge
Some content delivery networks watch scripts as pages are served through them. They build the script inventory from CSP reports and alert on new or changed scripts. Cloudflare’s documentation on client-side security and PCI DSS says its product can help with requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1, and that you can deploy rules to block unauthorized scripts. That page is Cloudflare’s own description, not an independent assessment.
- Covers well: a continuously updated inventory, change alerts and policy enforcement, without changing application code.
- Falls short: only covers traffic through that provider. You still write and maintain the justifications, and confirm header monitoring is in scope.
3. In-page JavaScript agents
A specialist vendor’s script runs on your payment page and watches what other scripts do: which ones load, which fields they read and where they send data. It can block a script that misbehaves. Vendors such as Feroot and c/side publish guides on how their products map to 6.4.3 and 11.6.1. These are their own descriptions. Sigi has no affiliation with any vendor named here.
- Covers well: behaviour-level detail, such as a script that starts reading the card field or posting to a new domain, plus blocking in the browser.
- Falls short: the agent is itself a third-party script on your payment page. It belongs in your 6.4.3 inventory with a justification and integrity control, like any other script.
4. External scanners that load the page like a customer
A scanner loads the payment page in a real browser on a schedule, records the scripts and headers it received, compares them with an approved baseline and alerts on differences. It maps closely to the wording of 11.6.1: changes as received by a browser, on a regular cadence. It needs no code on your page.
- Covers well: scheduled change and tamper detection, header changes and an audit trail of each check.
- Falls short: it sees only what it is served. A skimmer that activates for certain visitors, regions or times may not show up for a scanner. That is why pairing a scanner with CSP reports from real sessions is common. This is our engineering assessment, not a statement from the PCI SSC.
How do you choose a tool for your checkout?
Choose a tool that covers both scripts and HTTP headers, keeps a justified script inventory and evidence your assessor accepts, sends alerts to someone who acts on them, and works with your provider’s embedded form. Ask these questions:
- Does it cover HTTP headers as well as scripts? 11.6.1 names both.
- Can it export a script inventory with a justification field per script, in a format your assessor accepts?
- Where do alerts go, and who acts on them? Requirement 12.10.5 expects your incident response plan to cover alerts from this mechanism.
- Does it add a script to the payment page? If so, how is that script itself authorized and integrity-checked?
- Does it work alongside your payment provider’s embedded frame without breaking it? Test this in a staging checkout before production.
- How noisy is it? A tool that alerts on every analytics update trains people to ignore alerts.
- What evidence does it keep, and for how long, to show checks ran at least weekly or at the frequency your risk analysis set?
- Would written confirmation from your payment provider (FAQ 1588) cover the requirement instead? Ask before buying anything.
In what order should you roll this out?
Confirm scope first, then cut the payment page’s scripts to the ones it needs, justify and protect each one, add weekly detection, and keep evidence. In order:
- Confirm scope with your acquirer: which questionnaire, and whether your provider’s written confirmation would cover script protection.
- Inventory every script on the payment page and on any page that can affect it, including scripts injected by tag managers.
- Remove what the payment page does not need. Marketing pixels, chat widgets and A/B testing scripts rarely belong next to a card form.
- Write a one-line business or technical justification for each script that remains, and name an owner.
- Deploy a Content Security Policy in report-only mode, read the reports for a week or two, then enforce it.
- Add Subresource Integrity to scripts whose contents you control or that are versioned. Leave out scripts a provider updates in place, and record why.
- Add the detection method you chose, set it to run at least weekly or at your risk-assessed frequency, and route alerts to a person on call.
- Write the response steps into your incident response plan, and keep evidence of every check for your next assessment.
- Repeat the inventory review whenever you add a payment method, a tag or a checkout page.
Related reading
For questionnaire eligibility and keeping card data off your servers, read the PCI-compliant checkout guide. For the platform decision underneath it, see Shopify vs custom e-commerce. The checkout builds mentioned here are written up as the Busy Bean Coffee case study and the ZIVA case study. For wider payment-system controls, see the fintech security checklist. Sigi’s e-commerce development practice and QA audit service cover this work.

